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Summary and conclusion 
Well integrity is an important topic in oil and gas well operations. The intention is to control 
the reservoir fluids and well pressures, by technical, operational and organizational barriers. 
Inadequate barriers can lead to unwanted influx and cause a kick, which can escalate further 
into a blowout.  
 The Deepwater Horizon accident in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 raised concerns about 
the safety of offshore deepwater drilling. This rig was considered to be an efficient and safe 
drilling unit, until the fatal blowout occurred leading to the loss of eleven lives, and the worst 
environmental disaster in US history. 
The main objective of a well barrier is to prevent leakage from the wellbore to the 
external environment during the various well operations. Well barriers are classified as 
primary or secondary barriers. The primary barriers are the barriers closest to the 
hydrocarbons and are the first obstacle to unwanted flow of formation fluid. The secondary 
barrier acts as a backup barrier. Barriers can further be classified as static or dynamic. The 
static barriers apply for the production phase, meaning that they are present over a longer 
period of time. Dynamic barriers occur during drilling and well intervention, and these are the 
once that are most difficult to assess because of the constantly changing parameters involved. 
Various drilling types such as overbalanced (conventional) and underbalanced drilling 
are used in the search for oil and gas. The main difference between these types, is how the 
pressure in the wellbore is maintained, and for this different barriers are needed. 
Laws and regulations dictate the requirements the industry has to follow. The 
Petroleum Safety Authority governs the regulations in Norway, and gives requirements to 
well barriers. In their regulations, they also refer to other guidelines and standards for more 
detailed requirements. NORSOK D-010 from 2013, “Well integrity in drilling and well 
operations”, is a widely used standard which defines requirements and guidelines relating to 
well integrity in drilling and well activities. Ways to regulate is found to vary between 
countries, such as for Norway and the US. 
  During drilling, a dynamic barrier situation applies, where the activation of the barrier 
depends on the current situation, and there is no pre-made sequence of barrier activation. 
Overall, this makes the assessment a difficult task. Various approaches have been suggested 
for the assessment of dynamic barriers over the years, with contributions to the topic from oil-
companies, standards and research papers. Most of what has been suggested has some kind of 
weaknesses, and no common approach has been accepted and put into use by the industry. As 
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a contribution a new approach has been suggested in this thesis. An overbalanced drilling 
operation in deep waters initiated by a kick is selected as case study. The approach is based on 
using two different types of analysis, in combination. An event tree is used to illustrate the 
dynamics of the event, and various fault trees are used to analyze the barriers involved. To 
understand what can cause a kick, the possibility of avoiding it, and what to do if it happens 
are given attention. From the suggested approach, it emerges that the human factor plays an 
important role in the kick evaluation and to maintain the well integrity.  
If the primary barrier is lost, there will be a kick. For this to escalate into a blowout, 
the secondary barrier must also be lost. If the control equipment functions as intended, lack of 
detection and understanding, together with insufficient training and competence of personnel 
can make this happen. 
 To prevent major accidents and hazardous events in the future, it is important to learn 
and gain experience from previous incidents and learn from each other, and the ability to 
work together, also between companies, on these difficult topics. 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
 
Contents 
 
Dedication ...............................................................................................................................i 
Preface .................................................................................................................................. ii 
Acknowledgment.................................................................................................................. iii 
Summary and Conclusions .................................................................................................... iv 
 
1   Introduction                 1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2  Traditional well barriers and requirements                 5                                                                                                                                                                               
2.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………..5 
2.2 NORSOK D-010 .......................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 ISO/TS 16530-2 ........................................................................................................... 7 
2.4 Well barriers during production .................................................................................... 8 
2.5 Requirements ............................................................................................................... 9 
2.6 Comparison of regulation regimes .............................................................................. 12 
 
3   Well barrier diagrams                          13                                                                                                                                                                                                          
3.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 13 
3.2 Approaches ............................................................................................................... 13 
3.3 Barrier diagram for an oil/gas producing well ............................................................ 19 
 
4   Dynamic well barriers during drilling                                                                        22            
4.1 Introduction............................................................................................................... 22 
4.2 OBD ......................................................................................................................... 24 
4.2.1 Primary barrier............................................................................................... 24 
4.2.2 Mud circulation system .................................................................................. 27 
4.3 Drilling fluids ............................................................................................................ 27 
4.3.1 Purpose of drilling fluids ................................................................................ 27 
4.3.2 Types of drilling fluids ................................................................................... 28 
4.4 Secondary barriers ..................................................................................................... 28 
Contents  vii 
 
4.4.1 Blowout preventer (BOP) .............................................................................. 29 
4.4.2 BOP stack configurations ............................................................................... 30 
4.4.3 Annular preventer .......................................................................................... 31 
4.4.4 Ram preventers .............................................................................................. 32 
4.4.5 Flexible joint.................................................................................................. 34 
4.4.6 Choke and Kill lines ...................................................................................... 34 
4.4.7 Test ram ......................................................................................................... 34 
4.4.8 Hydraulic connectors ..................................................................................... 34 
4.4.9 Casing ........................................................................................................... 35 
4.5 UBD ......................................................................................................................... 36 
4.5.1 Fluid introduction and circulation .................................................................. 38 
4.5.2 Barriers .......................................................................................................... 39 
4.6 Annulus vs. drill-string pressure ................................................................................ 39 
4.7 Subsea BOP control system ....................................................................................... 40 
4.8 Back- up control systems........................................................................................... 41 
 
5   Approaches for the assessment of dynamic barriers                 43                                                                                         
5.1 Introduction................................................................................................................ 43 
5.2 Event tree analysis ..................................................................................................... 43 
5.2.1 Objectives ........................................................................................................ 44 
5.2.2 Advantages and Limitations.............................................................................. 44 
5.3 Fault tree analysis....................................................................................................... 44 
5.3.1 Objectives ........................................................................................................ 45 
5.3.2 Advantages and Limitations.............................................................................. 45 
5.4 Drillers Hazop ............................................................................................................ 46  
5.5 New approach ............................................................................................................ 47  
5.6 Case study .................................................................................................................. 47  
5.6.1 Failure rates ...................................................................................................... 50 
5.6.2 PFD .................................................................................................................. 51 
5.6.3 Fault trees ......................................................................................................... 55 
 
6   Kicks – categories, Causes, and Handling                                                                       64                     
6.1 Introduction................................................................................................................ 64 
viii     Contents 
  
6.2 Warning signs of kicks ............................................................................................... 64 
6.3 Kick detection ............................................................................................................ 65  
6.4 Factors affecting kick severity .................................................................................... 66 
6.5 Categories of kicks ..................................................................................................... 66  
6.6 Kick causes ................................................................................................................ 67  
6.6.1 Unexpected high well pressure ......................................................................... 67 
6.6.2 Too low mud weight ......................................................................................... 67 
6.6.3 Gas cut mud ..................................................................................................... 67 
6.6.4 Lost circulation ................................................................................................. 67 
6.7 Kick handling ............................................................................................................. 68 
6.7.1 Shut- in procedures ........................................................................................... 68 
6.7.2 Conventional Kick circulation .......................................................................... 69 
6.7.3 Driller`s method ............................................................................................... 69 
6.7.4 Wait and weight ............................................................................................... 69 
 
7  Summary and Recommendations for Further Work                                                      71                      
7.1 Introduction................................................................................................................ 71 
7.2 Summary and conclusions .......................................................................................... 71 
7.3 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 73  
      7.4 Recommendations for further work ............................................................................ 73  
                                                                                                          
                                                                                                                        
Appendix  
                                                                                                                                  
A Acronyms                   76                                                                                              
B  Primary well barrier elements during production                                                  79                                                                                                                           
C Secondary well barrier elements during production                                         81 
D Example of possible well leak paths                                                                          83 
E Fault tree symbols                                                                              84 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Bibliography                 85                                                       
1 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Offshore drilling is a high-risk operation. A main contributor to this risk is from blowouts. 
This uncontrolled flow of hydrocarbons can cause harm to both people and the surrounding 
environment. The Deepwater Horizon accident in 2010 was a strong reminder of the danger 
and the consequences this type of event can cause, and the importance of well integrity. Well 
integrity includes the design, installation, operation and maintenance of all well equipment 
involved in an operation.   
In light of this accident, well barriers and the ability to ensure well integrity in the life-
cycle of the well has got increased focus in the petroleum industry. Billions of dollars are lost 
each year, caused by ineffective well maintenance and unplanned shut-ins of the well. Money 
is one concern, but possible threats to the environment and the danger to human life and their 
safety, must be the main priority. 
The importance of having the well barriers in place and the ability to understand them, 
and to test and maintain them during the life cycle of the well must not be underestimated. 
 Preventing a kick is the first line of defense to reduce the probability of getting a 
blowout. Unwanted influx of formation fluid into the wellbore comes from losing the well 
control, the primary barrier, thus creating a kick. If this kick is not detected or handled 
properly, it may result in a blowout if the secondary barrier fails or is not initiated. Preventive 
and risk reducing measures are important to mitigate and be able to control these undesired 
events. Knowledge of barriers and their behavior during drilling, with changing physical 
parameters and the time-dependent barrier situation is therefore becoming an important topic. 
Generally, two independent barriers are required in all types of well operations. These 
are further divided into a primary and a secondary barrier. 
In Norway, requirements to well barriers are given by the Petroleum Safety Authority 
(PSA). Various requirements to well barriers are also given in guidelines and standards, 
referred to by the PSA. Key requirement can be found in standards and guidelines such as 
NORSOK D-001 (2012), NORSOK D-010 (2013), OLF (2004), and API-RP-53 (2012). 
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Manuals and standards from various companies, and many reports have been 
published worldwide on the subject of well integrity. A widely used standard is the NORSOK 
D-010. The latest version, “Well integrity in drilling and well operations”, was released in 
2013. This standard defines requirements and guidelines relating to well integrity in drilling 
and well activities.  
The blowout in the Deepwater Horizon accident made the petroleum industry to 
examine their regulations and practices. They had to see what could be done to prevent this 
kind of accident to happen again. In 2011, the Norwegian Oil and Gas Association released 
the report, “Deepwater Horizon - Lessons learned and follow-up”, which contained 
recommendations for updating the existing NORSOK D-010. In the current version from 
2013, more safety enhancements have been included, and these will have an impact on the 
well design, thus likely to drive up the costs for the operators. The NORSOK D-010 (2013) is 
considered to be the world-leading standard for well integrity, and covers the whole lifecycle 
of the well. This standard has been a good source when writing the current report. The most 
recent contribution to the subject of well integrity is ISO/TS 16530-2 “Well integrity for the 
operational phase” published in august 2014. This is a technical specification with the 
intension of giving requirements and information to well operators on managing well integrity 
for the operational phase. 
 In the production phase, the well is considered to be stable. The well barriers in this 
phase may be analyzed and evaluated by using different types of well barrier diagrams. If 
further reliability assessment is desired, these diagrams can be transferred to fault trees and 
block diagrams. 
 When it comes to the drilling- and intervention phase, the barrier situation is dynamic. 
This makes it more complicated, and the familiar diagrams cannot be easily used.  
The barrier situation now depends on the current situation, and there is no pre-made sequence 
of barrier activations. This raises a demand for an approach to the assessment of these 
dynamic barriers. Several procedures have been developed for the assessment of barriers over 
the years, but none has fully succeeded. The procedures are not good enough, and there is a 
need for methods that are more suitable. In this report a method is developed for the 
assessment of dynamic barriers, and a case study is performed. 
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The overall objective of this master thesis is to study, evaluate, and discuss possible 
approaches to the assessment of dynamic well barriers. 
 
To meet the overall objective, the following sub-objectives have been treated: 
 
1. Identify and describe traditional well barriers and present a survey of requirements to 
well barriers in regulations and standards. 
2. Establish static well barrier diagrams for a selected operation, and discuss approaches 
to illustrate the well barrier diagrams. 
3. Identify and describe dynamic aspects of well barriers and illustrate the 
time/procedure-dependent barrier situation. 
4. Suggest an analytical approach for the assessment of dynamic well barriers. 
5. Carry out a case study based on the approaches suggested in item 4. 
6. Identify and discuss challenges to dynamic well barrier assessment, for which further 
research is needed. 
 
To try to make a useful contribution, it was decided to focus on mainly one specific operation. 
The new assessment approach is limited to offshore drilling in deep waters, using 
overbalanced drilling. Only the drilling-phase and its vertical movement downwards are 
considered.  
In agreement with the responsible supervisor, a summary in Norwegian is not included in 
this thesis. The report is structured in such a way, that the sub-objectives are addressed in 
turns from 1 to 6, with corresponding chapters from 2 until 7.The sub-objectives are answered 
in best possible way, based on how they were interpreted. All figures, etc. were made in 
VISIO. Chapter 2 gives an insight in traditional well barriers and their requirements. In 
Chapter 3 various approaches for the illustration of well barrier diagrams are presented, and a 
new vertical approach is suggested. The approach has been illustrated based on a well barrier 
schematic for a selected production well. The fourth Chapter deals with dynamic well 
barriers, and the main focus is on the barriers during drilling. Various differences between 
overbalanced drilling and underbalanced drilling are also highlighted here.  
Chapter 5 suggests various approaches for the assessment of dynamic barriers. A case study is 
performed based on a new suggested approach.  
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The most important issues related to kick`s in overbalanced drilling are presented in Chapter 
6. The last chapter, Chapter 7, sums up the work done and results found in the project, and 
gives recommendations for further work.
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Chapter 2 
Traditional Well Barriers and Requirements 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the traditional well barriers and presents their requirements in various 
regulations and standards. The main focus is on the NORSOK D-010 (2013). A well barrier is 
a safety barrier used in the petroleum industry, and can be related to various well operations. 
The safety barrier is important to reduce the risk of accidents.  
 Sklet (2005) defines a safety barrier and the barrier function as: 
Safety barriers are physical and/or non-physical means planned to prevent, 
control or mitigate undesired events or accidents. 
A barrier function is a function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate 
undesired events or accidents. 
Within the petroleum activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), the PSA governs 
the regulations concerning health, environment, and safety. PSA has developed requirements 
to the safety barriers, and the main features are reproduced in Section 2.5. There are many 
ways to classify barriers, and one of them is illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Classification of safety barriers (from Sklet, 2005). 
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The main objectives of a well barrier are according to Hauge et al. (2012):  
 Prevent any major hydrocarbon leakage from the well to the external environment 
during normal production or well operations.  
 Shut in the well on direct command during an emergency shutdown situation and 
thereby prevent hydrocarbons from flowing from the well.  
 
2.2 NORSOK D-010 
NORSOK D-010 (2013), Well integrity in drilling and well operations, was developed with 
broad petroleum industry participation by interested parties in the Norwegian petroleum 
industry, and is owned by the Norwegian petroleum industry represented by the Norwegian 
Oil and Gas Association and the Federation of Norwegian Industries.  
The standard focuses on establishing well barriers by use of well barrier elements 
(WBE), their acceptance criteria, and their use and monitoring of integrity during their life 
cycle. Testing procedures and operational requirements are described in the standard to ensure 
the quality of the WBEs. NORSOK D-010 (2013) contains 59 acceptance tables, representing 
the various WBEs. These include how to perform initial testing and verification, description 
of the functionality of the barrier element, design criteria, proper use and monitoring, and 
potential failure modes. The acceptance tables are based on API-, ISO-, and NORSOK 
standards. In this current version of the standard, more safety enhancements have been 
included, which will have an impact on the future well design. 
NORSOK D-010 (2013) defines a well barrier as “an envelope of one or several well 
barrier elements preventing fluids from flowing unintentionally from the formation into the 
wellbore, into another formation or to the external environment”. A WBE is referred to as “a 
physical element which in itself does not prevent flow but in combination with other WBE`s 
forms a well barrier”.  
Well integrity is an important topic when it comes to drilling, and other well 
operations. In this standard, well integrity is defined as “an application of technical, 
operational, and organizational solutions to reduce the risk of uncontrolled release of 
formation fluids throughout the life cycle of a well”.  
According to NORSOK D-010 (2013) and PSA (2010) the well barriers shall be 
designed to prevent unintended influx and outflow to the external environment and designed 
so that their performance can be tested and verified.  
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OLF (2011) states that the well barriers shall be designed, manufactured and installed to 
withstand all loads they may be exposed to and maintain their function throughout the life 
cycle of the well. Further, the materials and functions should be selected to withstand the 
loads and environment to which the well barrier may be exposed, and the physical location 
and the integrity status/conditions of the barriers shall be known at all times. The well barrier 
can be defined in series or in parallel, as primary or secondary, temporary or permanent, 
active or passive, or as physical or non-physical (NORSOK D-010, 2013). Section 2.4 
describes the primary and secondary barriers of a production well. 
 
2.3 ISO/TS 16530-2 
ISO/TS 16530-2, “Well integrity for the operational phase”, published in august 2014, is the 
most recent contribution to the subject of well integrity. The standard was developed by 
several companies together, for oil and gas. This is a technical specification (TS) with the 
intension of giving requirements and information to well operators in the petroleum and 
natural gas industry worldwide, on how to manage well integrity in the operational phase.  
The TS must be seen as an addition to legal requirements, and not a replacement. All 
wells that are used by the oil and gas industry are included in the scope of this standard. This 
is regardless of age, type, or location. ISO/TS 16530-2 does not apply for work-over 
activities, or the periods during well intervention. The well intervention equipment required or 
used outside the well envelope for a wire-line or a coiled tubing operation are not included 
either. 
  
Other standards in the same category includes ISO/AWI 16530-1, “Well integrity-Part 1: Life 
cycle governance manual” and the recommended practice API-RP-90, “Annular casing 
pressure management for offshore wells”. 
Table 1 presents some barrier types. The table includes functions, how they are operated, and 
how their failures are observed. There are also other types of barriers, so these are only 
examples. 
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Table 1:  Example of barrier types (from Holand, 1996). 
Barrier type Description Example 
Operational 
barrier 
A barrier that functions while 
the operation is carried out. 
A barrier failure will be 
observed when it occurs. 
Drilling mud, stuffing box 
Active barrier 
(Standby barriers) 
An external action is required 
to activate the barrier. Barrier 
failures are normally 
observed during regular 
testing.  
BOP, X-mas tree, surface 
controlled subsurface safety 
valve (SCSSV) 
Passive barrier A barrier in place that 
functions continuously 
without any external action. 
Casing, tubing, kill fluid, 
well packer 
Conditional barrier A barrier that is either not 
always in place or not always 
capable of functioning as a 
barrier. 
Stabbing valve (WR-SCSSV) 
 
 
2.4 Well barriers during production 
 Figure 2 shows a well barrier schematic, illustrating the primary and secondary well barriers 
with their barrier elements for a production well. The primary and secondary barriers are 
illustrated in blue and red, respectively. 
 
Primary: This is the barrier closest to the pressurized hydrocarbons, and the first obstacle to 
unwanted flow of formation fluid. 
Secondary: The secondary barrier acts as a backup barrier, and is located outside the primary 
barrier. This barrier will prevent outflow from the well if the primary barrier fails. 
There may also be a tertiary barrier available to stop the flow of hydrocarbons, if the first two 
fails.  
Appendix B provides a table describing the various primary well barrier elements, and 
their purpose. A similar table for the secondary well barrier elements is provided in Appendix 
C. Both are related to the production well shown in Figure 2, and the information has been 
found in NORSOK D-010 (2013).  
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The well barrier elements in-situ formation, casing cement and casing which act as a 
secondary well barrier in Figure 2, are listed in the table for the primary elements in Appendix 
B, because of their similarity to these elements. 
 
There are typically two main types of barriers: 
 Static barriers 
 Dynamic barriers 
 
A static barrier is in place over a “long” period of time, and applies typically during 
production/injection. Dynamic barriers vary over time, such as for well drilling and 
intervention. In this part of the thesis, the static barriers are considered. Barriers present in a 
production well are identified and described. The dynamic barriers are further discussed in 
Chapter 4. 
 
PSA (2010) suggests that the performance of a well barrier may be characterized by its: 
 Functionality/efficiency: the ability to function as specified in the design requirements. 
 Reliability/availability: the ability to function on demand or continuously. 
 Robustness: the ability to function as specified under given accident conditions. 
 
2.5 Requirements 
Laws and regulations dictate the requirements that the industry has to follow. Different rules 
exist in countries all over the world. In Norway, the regulations are governed by the PSA. 
PSA gives requirements in their regulations, but also refers to recognized guidelines and 
standards for more detailed requirements. Key requirement can be found in standards and 
guidelines, such as NORSOK D-001(2012), NORSOK D-010 (2013), OLF (2004), and  
API-RP-53 (2012).This section, lists the requirements from PSA and NORSOK D-010. 
 
Well barrier requirements from PSA (2010):  
 Well barriers shall be designed such that well integrity is ensured and the barrier 
functions are safeguarded during the well's lifetime. 
 Well barriers shall be designed such that unintended well influx and outflow to the 
external environment is prevented, and such that they do not hinder well activities. 
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 When a production well is temporarily abandoned without a completion string, at least 
two qualified and independent barriers shall be present. 
 When a well is temporarily or permanently abandoned, the barriers shall be designed 
such that they take into account well integrity for the longest period of time the well is 
expected to be abandoned. 
 When plugging wells, it shall be possible to cut the casings without harming the 
surroundings. 
 The well barriers shall be designed such that their performance can be verified. 
 
According to NORSOK D-010 (2013) the well barriers shall be designed, selected and 
constructed with capability to: 
 
 Withstand the maximum differential pressure and temperature it may become exposed 
to. 
 Be pressure- and function tested or verified by other methods. 
 Ensure that no single failure of a well barrier or WBE can lead to uncontrolled flow of 
wellbore fluids or gases to the external environment. 
 Re-establish a lost well barrier or establish another alternative well barrier. 
 Operate competently and withstand the environment for which it may be exposed to 
over time. 
 Determine the physical position/location and integrity status at all times when such 
monitoring is possible. 
 Be independent of each other and avoid having common WBEs to the extent possible. 
 
On the NCS all the operating companies are obliged by the regulations to have a management 
system. This system should reflect how the various activities are carried out, and how the 
companies operate. The companies also need a system to control the health, safety and 
environmental (HSE) level of their operations. A system for managing the well integrity for 
all the operators’ wells during their life cycle, is also required on the NCS. The intension is to 
control and reduce the risk. 
 Competence and training requirements for personnel are specified in NORSOK D-010 
(2013), and in the regulations. 
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Figure 2: Well barriers, production (from NORSOK D-010, 2013). 
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2.6 Comparison of regulation regimes 
To demonstrate some differences in how to regulate, a study conducted by Det Norske Veritas 
(DNV), now DNV GL, has been considered. The study, (DNV, 2010), mapped the differences 
in regulations between the NCS and the US (Gulf of Mexico). DNV performed the study after 
the Deepwater Horizon accident, and was a neutral and technical comparison. A summary is 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Main differences in regulation regimes.  
Main differences  
NORWAY US 
Mainly function based, where security and 
performance criteria are set, and with 
supplementary prescriptive requirements. 
 
 
Mainly prescriptive. 
 
 
Mainly risk based, meaning activities are 
always built on identified risks. Working to 
reduce risk levels, and priorities should 
reflect current risk levels. 
 
No such requirements. 
 
The health, safety and environmental 
management , and the resource management 
are controlled by different authorities.  
 
Both handled by the same authority (April 
2010). 
PSA has a coordinating role in the 
development and monitoring of the 
implementation of HSE regulations.  
 
No coordinating authority. 
The operating company has the responsibility 
that all petroleum activities are following the 
given regulations. 
 
Operator and the government sharing the 
responsibility of petroleum activities. 
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Chapter 3 
Well Barrier Diagrams 
 
3.1 Introduction 
To assess oil well integrity, the oil and gas industry has used barrier diagrams, also called well 
barrier diagrams, for several decades. This chapter presents different approaches to illustrate 
these types of diagrams. Safety barrier diagrams are another name used in this chapter. Based 
on a selected oil/gas well operation, a well barrier diagram has been established.  
 
3.2 Approaches 
There are many different ways to illustrate the role of well barriers and their role in acting 
upon and preventing leakages. We can distinguish between: 
 Well barrier schematics (WBS) 
 Barrier diagrams 
 
A WBS is a static illustration of the well and its main barrier elements. The various elements 
are marked with different colors. In Figure 2 in Section 2.4, a WBS is shown for a production 
well. 
In Hauge et al. (2012) we can read that a well barrier diagram is a network illustrating 
all the possible leak paths from the reservoir to the surroundings. The meaning of the term 
surroundings depends on the situation. It may be the external environment, e.g., the sea for a 
subsea well. Well barrier diagrams are best suited for static situations, such as wells in 
production. An example of a well barrier diagram of such a situation has been made, and is 
shown in Section 3.3. 
Different approaches to illustrate the possible leak paths exist. One option is to draw a 
horizontal diagram going from left to right, from reservoir to the surroundings. A selected 
example is shown in Figure 3. Appendix D provides a well diagram showing possible leak 
paths. 
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Reservoir
Ball valve
Gravel pack
packer
Seal 
assembly
Lower most 
packer
Top packer
Bridge plug
Surroundings
 
        Figure 3:  Barrier diagram for a temporary abandoned production well  
(from Holand, 1996). 
 
A more common option is to draw a vertical diagram, from reservoir at the bottom to the 
surroundings at the top. This is the type of diagram used for the selected operation in Section 
3.3 of this thesis. Fault tree (FT), event tree (ET) and Bow-tie can also be used for illustration. 
Regardless of which option selected, the logic of the diagram should be the same. 
 
Duijm and Markert (2009) define a safety barrier diagram as: 
“A graphical presentation of the evolution of unwanted events (initiating events or conditions) 
through different system states depending on the functioning of the safety barriers intended to 
abort this evolution.” 
 
The main objectives of a safety barrier diagram according to Rausand (2011) are: 
 Identify barriers that are (or should be) present in a specified accident scenario (i.e., an 
event sequence from an initiating event or cause to a final consequence). 
 Illustrate the sequence in which the various barriers are to be activated. 
 Identify safety barriers that are common for several accident scenarios. 
 Identify hazards for which protection is inadequate. 
 Verify the adequacy of the existing barriers and indicate where improvements are 
needed. 
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Cause
Hazardous
event
Consequences
Barrier 1 Barrier 2
Proactive
barrier
Reactive
barrier
 
Figure 4: Example of safety barrier diagram (from Rausand, 2011) 
 
In Figure 4 the basic elements of a safety barrier diagram are illustrated. These types of 
diagrams have similarities to both a FT and a FT, using the same logic. The safety barrier 
diagrams are easier to understand by non-experts because basic events and logic related to the 
functioning of the safety barriers are encapsulated in a single item. This causes fever symbols 
in a graph, and better to interpret. The different barriers are drawn as a rectangle. On the left-
hand side of a barrier, we find the condition or event which triggers the barrier to function 
(condition on demand). On the right-hand side of the barrier, is normally the condition when 
the barrier has failed (condition on failure). Apart from this, one can also define other 
conditions on this side, typically the condition of success can be included, if that condition is 
not a normal (safe) state. The diagram shows possible accident scenarios. When a barrier is 
successful, the scenario stops there. If the barrier fails, the diagram shows the next barrier. 
This can go on until all the barriers have failed, and the accident occurs (Duijm and Markert, 
2009). 
 
 
16      Chapter 3. Well barrier diagrams 
 
Demand 
condition 
     or
   event
Condition
on failure
Condition
on success
Barrier
 
Figure 5:  Graphical presentation of a safety barrier in safety-barrier diagrams with two    
output conditions (from Duijm and Markert, 2009). 
 
Barrier 
functions 
on demand
Demand
condition or
event
Barrier fails
on demand
Condition
on success
Condition
on failure
AND
AND
 
        Figure 6:  Representation of the barrier from Figure 5 by means of a FT  
(from Duijm, 2009). 
 
In Figure 6, the barrier is represented by an AND gate. If both inputs are positive we will get a 
positive (“true”) outcome, and only then. The inverted value of the statement “barrier fails on 
demand” is “barrier functions on demand”. This means that if one of them is true, the other is 
false and vice versa. Among the main advantages of a barrier diagram compared to e.g., FT or 
ET is the relative simplicity. In Figure 6, a new input condition (“barrier works”) and a logical 
gate are introduced to be able to show the condition on success. 
In Corneliussen (2006) another method for constructing barrier diagrams is being presented. 
In his doctoral thesis the author uses a typical oil production well with the x-mas tree located 
on the surface as a basis, shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7: Example well (from Corneliussen, 2006). 
 
A well barrier is regarded as a pressurized vessel (envelope), with the capability of containing 
the reservoir fluids. The well in Figure 7 is considered as several pressurized vessels 
(envelopes) preventing the fluid from entering the surroundings. This is illustrated in Figure 8.  
18      Chapter 3. Well barrier diagrams 
 
 
Figure 8: Well illustrated as several vessels (from Corneliussen, 2006). 
The primary barrier, closest to the reservoir, is illustrated as the outlet valve in Figure 8. This 
is the innermost vessel with the SCSSV. The outer vessels illustrate the consecutive well 
barriers. 
According to (Corneliussen, 2006) the main construction steps of this type of barrier diagram 
are: 
 
1. Define the hazardous event. 
Before constructing the diagram, the hazardous event and the WBEs available to 
prevent it are clearly defined. 
 
2. Define cavities (“the pressurized vessels”) where the pressure can be trapped between 
the reservoir and the surroundings. 
In this step all the “pressurized vessels” surrounded by WBEs able to contain the 
reservoir fluids are identified. 
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3. Identify the WBE failure modes and corresponding leak paths. 
This step includes, as the headline implies, identification of all WBEs failure modes 
and their corresponding leak paths. 
 
4. Identify the fault tolerance of the well system. 
The fault tolerance of the well is indicated by the number of WBE failures which must 
occur before having an uncontrolled leak (from reservoir to surroundings). This 
tolerance is defined by IEC 61508.   
 
5. Identify barrier vectors. 
Intermediate step which includes identification of barrier vectors. This vector 
describes the start and end point (cavity) for each leak path. 
 
6. Identify minimal cut sets. 
The vectors found in step 5 are used here to identify the minimal cut sets of the well 
system.  
 
7. Calculate leak probabilities. 
Using the cut sets from step 6, approximate formulas can be used to calculate this 
probability. 
 
The diagram is used to illustrate the structural relationship between well barriers. 
Construction rules are presented in seven steps, listed above, and there are also proposed 
five guidelines for validation of the barrier diagram. These guidelines are not listed in this 
thesis. 
 
3.3 Barrier diagram for an oil/gas producing well 
This section presents a new suggested version of a vertical barrier diagram. The well barrier 
diagram in Figure 10 is based on the production well in Figure 2, from Chapter 2. In this 
approach all the primary barriers have been assembled, and all the secondary barriers placed 
together. Arrows are used to point out the various pathways between the barriers, different 
annuli, to the surroundings. 
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The names used for the various well barriers elements in the diagram, refers to the ones used 
in Figure 2, but some names are changed. The completion string has become the c.string, and 
the wellhead/annulus access valves are now referred to as wellhead in Figure 10. 
 
Some assumptions have been made before drawing the diagram: 
The chemical injection valve (CIV) has not been included, because it is the same as consider 
leakage from under the downhole safety valve (DHSV) to the A-annulus. Because of its small 
diameter, the control line from the DHSV is also ruled out from the diagram. Cap rock is 
assumed to be impermeable, so there will be no leakage outside the casing-program. Only 
leak paths going inside out, are considered (e.g., from A-annulus to B-annulus, and not back 
from B to A). The 9 5/8” casing, above and below the production packer, are emerged to one 
“box” called 9 5/8” casing. It is here assumed that there will be plenty of good cement and no 
leakage through it. Figure 9 explains symbols and colors used in the well barrier diagram.    
 
 
Annuli / Void
Primary barrier
Secondary barrier  
 
Figure 9: Symbol and color description for the well barrier diagram. 
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Reservoir
A-annulus B-annulus
Surroundings
Surface tree
WH/XT
connector
Tubing
hanger
Wellhead
Casing
hanger
13 3/8"
casing
13 3/8"
shoe
13 3/8"
cement
9 5/8" 
casing
Production 
packer
C. string
below
DHSV
DHSV
C-annulus
 
Figure 10: Well barrier diagram for a selected well. 
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Chapter 4 
Dynamic Well Barriers during Drilling 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with dynamic well barriers. The main focus is on barriers during drilling. 
Both overbalanced /conventional drilling (OBD) and underbalanced drilling (UBD) are 
considered, with the main focus on OBD. In designing and execution of the drilling process, 
inflow prevention/inflow control is an important factor. The keyword is pressure control, 
control of the down-hole pressure.  
 
NORSOK D-010 (2013) specifies the following: 
“There shall be two well barriers available during all well activities and operations, 
including suspended or abandoned wells, where a pressure differential exists that may cause 
uncontrolled outflow from the borehole/well to the external environment.” 
 
The primary barrier during drilling activities is the mud column and its hydrostatic pressure 
(Ph). The secondary is the blowout preventer (BOP) combined with the casing and wellhead. 
These barriers are illustrated in Figure 12 and apply for OBD operations. When drilling the 
top hole for the conductor and the surface casing, this can according to NORSOK D-010 
(2013) be done with the mud column as the only well barrier. Further, one of the secondary 
barriers, the BOP, must be installed prior to drilling out the surface casing. 
 
The principle of modern rotary drilling 
A rotary drilling method is used when drilling modern oil and gas wells. The three main 
ingredients are according to (Rigpass, 2012): 
 Rotating torque on the drill-bit. 
 Axial force on the drill-bit. 
 Fluid circulation to clear the cuttings from the bit, and remove them from the 
wellbore. 
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Figure 11: The drilling process (from Skalle, 2011). 
 
Figure 11 illustrates a typical drilling process with its various components. The well is drilled 
by the teeth of the drill-bit (rock bit). Different types of energy are transmitted to the drill bit 
to able the crushing of the rock, and removal of the cuttings from the well.  The drill-string 
and the drill collars create a downward force, the mud flows down inside the drill-string 
rotating the drill-bit (mud motor), and also helps to get the cuttings away from the wellbore.  
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4.2 OBD  
4.2.1 Primary barrier 
The mud column is the first line of defense against a blowout using OBD. Many drilling 
problems are due to situations or conditions that occur after drilling begins. The mud may not 
be designed for this, causing problems. By adjusting the properties of the mud, some of these 
problems can be solved. Most common is to change weight or density of the mud.  
Weighting materials are added when high-pressure formations are expected. In conventional 
drilling, wells are drilled overbalanced. Table 3 shows that the purpose of the mud column is 
to exert a Ph, which will prevent influx of formation fluid, and by that prevent a kick. If the 
well pressure falls below the pore pressure (Pp), reservoir fluids or gas will leak into the well. 
This is called an influx, and if this is above a certain size, we will get what is termed a kick. 
This may lead to a blowout, if not handled properly. Kick-handling and causes of kicks are 
further discussed in Chapter 6. 
 Hydrocarbons (HC) should not be able to flow out or into the well as long as the Ph 
exerts pressure on the formation that is higher than the Pp. When Ph > Pp, the well is said to 
be overbalanced. If this is not the case, the well is underbalanced. This means that the mud 
column is no longer capable on its own to prevent inflow of HC.  
The hydrostatic pressure can be calculated from the formula: 
Ph = ρgh  
Where ρ = fluid density [
  
  
]  
 g = gravity [9.8
 
   
] 
 h = height, which is here the true vertical depth (TVD). [m] 
Table 3, shown below, includes a description and the purpose of the primary barrier element 
during OBD, based on Figure 12. 
 
Table 3: Primary well barrier. OBD. 
Well barrier element Description Function/Purpose 
Fluid(mud) column 
 
 
 
The fluid in the wellbore. To exert a hydrostatic 
pressure in the wellbore that 
will prevent well influx/ 
inflow (kick) of formation 
fluid. 
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Figure 12: Well barriers, OBD (from NORSOK D-010, 2013). 
 
For conventional drilling, Ph must be higher than Pp to avoid influx, but also below the 
fracture pressure. The Ph must be somewhere between the purple and blue line shown in 
Figure 13. This figure shows that with increased water depth the margin m between the pore 
pressure and the fracture pressure gradients reduces, and by this more casings are needed.  
Usually, the Pp increases with depth, and is said to be normal when it is equal to the 
pressure of a column of water extending from the formation to the surface (Rigpass, 2012). 
The geological conditions determine if the Pp are subnormal or higher than the normal 
formation pressure. 
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Figure 13: Typical casing program using a 18 ¾” wellhead system (from TPG 4200, 2012). 
  
A leak off test (LOT) determines the fracture pressure. This test is also called a formation 
intake strength test, and is carried out at the casing shoe. The purpose is to investigate the 
wellbore capability to withstand pressures immediately below the casing shoe. By doing this, 
a proper well planning can be done with regard to safe mud weight, and to determine the 
setting depth of the next casing. When abnormal pressure is expected further down, this is 
especially important. Conducting a LOT is important to prevent lost circulation, which is a 
cause of kick, further described in Chapter 6. The procedure on how to conduct a LOT is 
further described by Skalle (2011).  
 Formation integrity test (FIT) is typically used to test the strength of the formation and 
the casing shoe. This is done by increasing the BHP to designed pressure, but not to break the 
formation. 
 
 
Chapter 4. Dynamic well barriers    27 
 
4.2.2 Mud circulation system  
An important function of the circulation system, both in OBD and UBD, is to control or 
eliminate the inflow of formation fluid into the wellbore during drilling operations. Drilling 
fluid is referred to as mud. 
The mud circulation system in OBD consists of high pressure pumps, which pump a 
drilling fluid with proper density into the drill-string to overbalance the Pp.  
The fluid goes down the drill-string, through the nozzles in the drill-bit, and back to the 
platform through the annular space between the drill-string and the borehole wall (annulus). 
On its way back to the surface, the fluid carries the formation cuttings upwards. At the 
surface, the fluid leaves the wellbore at an atmospheric pressure. Before being pumped back 
into the wellbore, the fluid goes through a cutting removal and mud condition system. 
To maintain the primary barrier, the availability of the mud circulation system is very 
important. This is more or less a continuously running system, and a failure while running 
may cause a kick. This might be a pump failure, or mud with the wrong quality. If this is the 
case, the kick might develop into a blowout because of unavailability to circulate the mud. 
Circulating and controlling a kick in OBD can be a critical issue due to the limited capacity of 
surface facilities to handle a large quantity of produced HC evacuated from the wellbore. In 
UBD operations the flow of reservoir fluids into the wellbore and their circulation and 
evacuation at the surface, is a normal situation. Causes of kick`s, and how to handle them are 
further outlined in Chapter 6.  
 
4.3 Drilling fluids 
4.3.1 Purpose of drilling fluids 
Drilling fluids suit several purposes. When heat is generated by the friction as the bit drills 
into the rock formation, the circulating mud dissipates the heat and also lubricates the bit. 
Another important function is the removal of cuttings. Mud transports the cuttings to a 
treating equipment where the cuttings are removed, and clean mud is again ready to be 
pumped down the drill-string. Sometimes, the mud circulation is lost or has to be stopped. In 
these cases, it is important to avoid the suspension of cuttings at the bit, as this may cause the 
drill-pipe to be stuck.  The mud must have a gelling like characteristics to prevent this. 
Cuttings brought to the surface can tell what kind of formation being drilled, and the mud acts 
as a “data source”. The mud also creates an impermeable filter cake during drilling, which 
gives temporary support to the wall of the borehole.  
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4.3.2 Types of drilling fluids 
Drilling fluids have complicated flow behavior, and can be referred to as “programmable 
fluids”. They need to be thin with low resistance to be able to flow inside the long drill-string. 
Upwards in the annulus, they need to be thick and viscous to allow lifting and carrying of the 
cuttings. On the surface, the fluids needs to be thin again to make it easier to separate the 
cuttings, and also for making the pumping back into the drill-string more efficient (Rigpass, 
2012).  
There are several different types of drilling fluids, based on both their composition and 
use. The drilling fluid can be air, foam (a combination of air and liquid) and liquid. Liquid 
drilling fluids are as mentioned earlier, commonly called drilling mud. Drilling fluids, 
especially the mud, can have a wide range of chemical and physical properties. Which type of 
fluid to select depends on anticipated well conditions or on the specific interval of the well 
being drilled. Cost, technical performance and environmental impacts are also factors being 
considered. Water-based fluids are the most common, and used to drill approximately 80% of 
all wells. Oil-based and synthetic-based fluids are two other categories of drilling fluids being 
used. 
 
4.4 Secondary barriers  
Table 4 gives a description and the purposes of the secondary barrier elements during OBD, 
based on Figure 12. 
Table 4: Secondary well barriers. OBD. 
Well barrier element Description Function/Purpose 
In-situ formation 
 
 
 
The formation that has been 
drilled through and is located 
beside the casing annulus, 
isolation material or plugs set 
in the wellbore. 
 
To provide a permanent and 
impermeable hydraulic seal 
preventing flow from the 
wellbore to surface/seabed or 
other formation zones. 
Casing cement 
 
 
Consists of cement in solid 
state located in the annulus 
between concentric casing 
strings, or the casing/liner 
and the formation. 
 
To provide a continuous, 
permanent and impermeable 
hydraulic seal along hole in 
the casing annulus or 
between casing strings, to 
prevent flow of formation 
fluids, resist pressures from 
above or below, and support 
casing or liner strings  
structurally. 
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Well barrier element Description Function/Purpose 
Casing 
 
 
Consists of casing/liner, 
and/or tubing in case tubing 
is used for through tubing 
drilling and completion 
operations. 
The purpose of casing/liner is 
to provide an isolation that 
stops uncontrolled flow of 
formation fluid or injected 
fluid between the casing bore 
and the casing annulus. 
Wellhead 
 
Consists of the wellhead 
body with annulus access 
ports and valves, seals and 
casing hangers with seal 
assemblies. 
To provide mechanical 
support for the suspending 
casing and tubing strings and 
for hook-up of risers, or BOP 
or tree, and to prevent flow 
from the bore and annuli to 
formation or the 
environment. 
High pressure riser Consists of the riser 
including connectors and 
seals connecting the drilling 
BOP to the wellhead. 
To act as an extension of the 
drilling BOP on platforms 
where the BOP and wellhead 
are positioned at different 
levels and thus prevent flow 
from the bore to the 
environment. 
Drilling BOP Consists of the wellhead 
connector and drilling BOP 
with kill/choke line valves. 
The wellhead connector shall 
prevent flow from the bore to 
the environment, and provide 
a mechanical connection 
between drilling BOP and the 
wellhead. The function of the 
BOP is to provide 
capabilities to close in and 
seal the wellbore with or 
without tools/equipment 
through the BOP. 
 
Key requirement can be found in standards and guidelines such as NORSOK D-001(2012), 
NORSOK D-010 (2013), OLF (2004), and API-RP-53 (2012). 
 
4.4.1 Blowout preventer 
The BOP is a part of the secondary barriers during drilling. These are safety-related 
instruments used mainly for the purpose of stopping kicks. Because of the kick`s ability to 
damage the environment and cause accidents to people and assets, it is desirable to stop or at 
least reduce the severity. We can distinguish between a rig BOP and a subsea BOP. This 
chapter focuses on the subsea BOP. 
30             Chapter 4. Dynamic well barriers 
 
The BOP is designed to stop the flow from the well by closing and sealing the well 
bore under all conditions, i.e., with or without tools/equipment through the BOP (NORSOK 
D-010, 2013). Several types of valves/preventers are required to satisfy all the design 
parameters. 
The subsea BOPs have increased in weight and size over the last decades, this due to 
the amount of equipment and increased redundancy. Weight has become a restrictive factor 
when it comes to the addition of “nice to have” equipment and redundancy, this because of 
how much load the wellhead can withstand. The BOP is placed on the seabed, on top of the 
wellhead and below the riser. According to Skalle (2011), the strongest BOP equipment is 
rated to withstand a pressure of 15000psi (1060 bars) from below. 
 
4.4.2 BOP stack configurations 
We usually distinguish between the classical and the modern configuration. The classical 
represents the basic concept of the BOP. The composition of the stacks is different, depending 
on company policy, preferences, and location, but the functions of the components are the 
same. The numbers of rams used varies, together with the control- and the backup control 
system. Organizing the stack causes advantages and disadvantages either way being done. 
Different components are added or omitted depending on the pressure rating needed. Annulars 
are typically not rated as high as ram preventers. Several manufactures make the components 
in a BOP configuration, such as Cameron, Shaffer and Hydrill.  
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Figure 14: Classical BOP Stack (from Holand, 1999). 
 
Figure 14 shows a typical classical BOP stack with six barrier elements. Seen from the top, 
there are two annular preventers, one upper annular preventer and one lower annular 
preventer. Further, there are one blind shear ram followed by three pipe rams, an upper pipe 
ram, middle pipe ram and a lower pipe ram. This classical stack is used constructing an event 
tree in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.3 Annular preventer 
“A device that can seal around any object in the wellbore or upon itself. Compression of a 
reinforced elastomer packing element by hydraulic pressure effects the seal” (API-RP-53, 
2012). 
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The annular preventer is a large valve used to control wellbore fluids. The sealing element in 
this type of valves resembles a large rubber doughnut. We usually find the annular preventer 
at the top of the BOP stack. These preventers are designed to seal off the annulus between the 
drill-string and the side of the hole. If a kick occurs while the pipe is out of the hole, the 
annular preventer may also seal off the open hole. The sealing element is mechanically 
squeezed by hydraulic force, and the flexibility of the doughnut allows the preventer to seal 
against many different shapes and sizes of tools in the well (drill-collar, drill-pipe, casing, or 
tubing). Retraction is also done using hydraulic fluid. It is possible to strip (move) the pipe in 
and out of the hole while closed. Annular preventers are often shut-in first due to their 
flexibility and position in the stack, but are not suited for holding in a kick for a long period of 
time alone. 
 
Figure 15: Annular preventer (from Wikipedia, 2014). 
 
4.4.4 Ram Preventers 
Normally, you will find ram preventers below the annular in the BOP stack. There are various 
types of rams, which are designed to perform different sets of tasks, but none are as flexible as 
the annular. 
Pipe rams are designed to seal around the pipe to close the annular space. They work 
on a similar principle as the annular preventer. Separate rams are necessary for each size 
(outside diameter) pipe in use if not using a variable bore ram. The variable bore ram has the 
ability to close on pipes with different diameters.  
Another type of ram preventer is the blind ram. This differs from the previous 
mentioned rams by its ability to seal on an open hole. They work in the same way, and the 
pressure from the hydraulic fluid pushes the flat opposing rams against each other to seal.  
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The shear ram preventer only have the capability to shear the pipe. These are made of 
hardened steel. 
A type called blind shear ram is yet another type of preventer. This also possesses the 
ability to close an open hole. When there is no pipe in the hole, this ram works like the blind 
ram, but has cutting ability to shear off the pipe and seal the hole. Usually it can’t shear the 
pipe joints/tool joint.   
Finally, we have the casing shear ram which can shear the casing, but without sealing 
the wellbore. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Illustration of the design for the blind ram (a), pipe ram (b), and the shear ram 
 (c) (from Wikipedia, 2014). 
 
From the description given about the annular and the pipe ram preventers, it is stated that they 
are designed to close the annulus when the drill pipe is in the hole. This means that a drill 
string safety valve (Kelly valve) is required to prevent flow from inside the drill string. 
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4.4.5 Flexible Joint 
Due to different kind of weather, the drilling rig will move during drilling. This causes loads 
on the wellhead from the tension between the BOP-connection and the riser. A flexible joint 
is placed on top of the BOP to compensate for the applied movement, making it possible to 
drill under more difficult conditions. It allows angular motion up to 10 degree (NORSOK D-
010, 2013). The joint consists of a metal housing with a large diameter, and with elastomeric 
element inside with two connectors. 
 
4.4.6 Choke and Kill lines 
When dealing with a well control event, the choke-line is used for circulating out the kick. 
The kill-line is used for pumping fluids into the well in a kick situation, and kill the well if 
necessary. This choke/kill system is also used during pressure testing of the BOP system. The 
attachment of the lines to the stack depends on the operator’s preference, and type of stack 
being used. Choke/kill valves are used to close the choke/kill lines. Two failsafe valves are 
placed in series, and these are controlled by the BOP control system.   
  
4.4.7 Test Ram 
This device can be a part of the BOP stack, placed at the bottom of the BOP. The test ram is 
an inverted pipe ram, used in testing the element above it in the BOP stack with no pipe in the 
hole. It’s designed to hold the pressure from above. Prior to the test ram, a plug was used. 
Setting and removing the plug was time-consuming, but still today many modern BOP stacks 
do not have a test ram. 
4.4.8 Hydraulic connectors 
The lower connector is between the BOP and the wellhead, and the upper connector is 
between the BOP and the lower marine riser package (LMRP). Their functions are to provide 
a mechanical connection between the mentioned parts, and prevent leakage to the 
environment. According to the Holand (2012) study, leakage in the wellhead connector is the 
most severe failure. Spurious opening of the LMRP was ranked second of the most severe 
failures reviled in the study. 
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4.4.9 Casing  
The casings are the major structural component of a well. Steel tubular (casing strings) are run 
in hole to protect the formation and maintain the borehole stability. There are six basic types 
of casing strings in varying size, purpose, and placement in the well (see Figure 17). The 
handling process, composition, testing and qualification of casing connections are one of the 
most important key factors to casing integrity, together with what the connection threads are 
composed of. 
 Proprietary and API-connections are the two most commonly used connections in the 
oil industry today. The API-connections are designed in accordance with tolerances specified 
by The American Petroleum Institute (API), and the proprietary are designed by and 
manufactured by commercial manufactures. Proprietary connections are capable of handling 
higher pressure and temperature on greater depths compared with the connections from API. 
 
 
Figure 17: Casing illustration (from NORSOK D-010, 2013). 
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4.5 UBD 
The pressure at the wellbore is maintained in a different manner when we go underbalanced. 
In OBD, the bottom-hole pressure (BHP) is determined by the mud density and the depth, this 
because the top of the column is not added any pressure except the atmospheric pressure. In 
UBD the BHP is controlled by a combination of the fluid density and the top column pressure.  
          =      +               
This formula applies in a case where there is no flow. When the fluid is circulated, another 
element also needs consideration, the flow friction. In OBD the flow friction in the annulus is 
relatively small, and the Ph controls the wellbore pressure. However, in UBD the friction 
plays a much more important role because of the low Ph and the relatively light fluid being 
used. In these types of operations, the down-hole annulus pressure during circulation is 
controlled by a combination of back pressure at the surface, flow friction, and the hydrostatic 
fluid pressure.  
          =      +               +            
However, if the mud is mixed with gas or formation fluids, the calculation of the BHP is 
becoming a more complex function, which will not be further discussed here. 
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Figure 18: Illustration of the BHP in various situations in UBD (from Rigpass,      
                  2012). 
 
Depth, density and top column pressure are the three aspects involved in controlling the 
pressure at the bottom of the mud column. Based on this, there are three ways to manipulate 
the Ph at the bottom of the mud column: either change the density or the pressure applied at 
the top of the column, or a combination of these two.  
There is a big difference if the well going underbalanced, or intentionally drilling 
underbalanced. In UBD operations influx is a normal situation. In this type of operations the 
BHP is below the Pp. However, if the BHP drops too much, the influx may exceed the 
handling capacity and the hole might also collapse. On the other hand, the probability of 
exceeding the fracture pressure is lower in UBD compared to OBD. The UBD approach has 
been used for drilling oil and gas wells for limited and particular applications in the past half 
century. Today, this approach is becoming more common, and is evolving with a wider range 
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of applications offshore and onshore. According to (Rigpass, 2012), UBD is often preferred as 
method compared to conventional drilling constructing long horizontal wells. 
Kick is defined different in UBD operations. API defines it as when the system is 
designed in a manner not capable of handling the formation pressure or flow rate that is 
experienced. The kick can be a result of poor choke control or formation characteristics, or 
engineering errors. 
The choke valve has a very important function in controlling the pressure during UBD. 
It is basically a very robust control valve built as a variable flow restriction. By moving the 
trim of the choke relative to a fixed seat, one can vary the opening of the choke and thus 
increase or decrease the wellbore pressure. 
 
4.5.1 Fluid introduction and circulation 
According to (Rigpass, 2012) there are three basic methods to introduce and circulate light 
fluids in UBD: 
 Drill-string injection 
 Parasite string 
 Parasite casing 
 
 
Figure 19: Methods for introducing and circulating fluid in UBD (from Rigpass, 2012). 
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The drill-string injection is used for drilling mud, and works in a similar manner as for the 
OBD. Gasified mud is being introduced by using the Parasite string or the Parasite casing 
method. 
 
4.5.2 Barriers 
The requirements of minimum two safety barriers present, also applies in UBD operations. 
The barrier function of the mud column from OBD is no longer intact, because the Ph is lower 
than the formation pressure. In UBD, the hydrostatic mud pressure barrier is substituted by a 
mechanical barrier.  
 At the top, the well is continuously pressurized, and the drill-string rotates and moves 
axially through a seal. The seal system is basically an annular BOP where the seal is in 
constant contact with the rotating drill-string, and rotates together with the string (Rigpass, 
2012). Rotating annulus seal elements is basically divided into passive or active. Rotating 
control heads (passive) uses a rubber element with added energy from the well pressure. The 
Rotating BOP (active), which is used by Statoil in UBD, energizes the seal by hydraulic 
pressure from a hydraulic module, and is placed on top of the conventional BOP.  The 
hydraulic module regulates the pressure automatically in line with the wellhead pressure. 
 The conventional BOP acts as the secondary barrier if the rotating BOP fails or leaks, 
or an abnormal drilling or circulation situation occurs. 
 
4.6 Annulus vs. drill- string pressure  
In drilling there are two parallel columns, the drill-string, and the annulus. These are linked in 
a U-Tube arrangement. They are like two branches sharing a common junction, where the 
pressure is equal at the junction for the two fluids. The liquid will rise to the same height in 
both columns, if the same liquid is used on either side. On the other hand, if a pressure should 
be applied on one side, thus raising the BHP, the liquid level on the other side will rise to 
compensate for the raise in BHP. The main concern in drilling and well control operations is 
regarding the annulus pressure. The annulus fluid is in contact with the formation and 
interface with the pressurized formation fluid.  
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4.7 Subsea BOP control system 
The control system operates and controls the functions of the BOP stack. Operating valves 
and adjusting chokes is typically performed by the control system, and are important 
functions in maintaining barriers. There are different types of subsea control systems, and the 
main differences relates to how the surface and subsea installations communicate.  
Conventional Hydraulic Control Systems can be divided into direct-, piloted-, and 
sequential- systems. These systems employ hydraulic signals to actuate subsea functions. The 
pilot and sequential are improved by using accumulators and subsea valves, compared to the 
direct system. Hydraulic fluid is sent from the surface, and stored in the accumulators and 
directed to the proper actuator when needed.  
Water depth is regarded as the major limitation to the hydraulic systems, due to its 
relatively long response time. The closed circuit solution of the hydraulic arrangement, where 
the fluid is transported back to the hydraulic power unit (HPU), and not to the sea, is the 
preferred solution to use, at least from an environmental point of view. Fluids used are 
generally based on water/glycols or hydrocarbon. 
Electro-hydraulic control systems and Multiplexing control system (MUX) are more 
complex systems, and are commonly used as the water depth increases. The electrical signals 
used by this systems, has a shorter response time compared to hydraulic signals covering the 
same distance. MUX uses solenoid valves which converts electrical energy into mechanical 
energy to open and close valves. In Figure 20 the differences between piloted hydraulic, 
electro-hydraulic and MUX control system are shown. 
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Figure 20: Control systems (from NORSOK D-001, 1998). 
 
The MUX system transmits coded signals from the Central Control Unit (CCU) on surface to 
the Subsea Electronic Module (SEM) located subsea. In the SEM, a modem decodes the 
signal and returns it to the CCU for verification. Once verified, the signal will be sent back 
down to the SEM, and further to a solenoid for activation of the required BOP function. The 
basic principles are illustrated in Figure 21. 
 A blue and a yellow control pod are located on the LMRP, and these include the SEM 
and the solenoid valves. Only one pod is being used, but there are two pods present to secure 
redundancy. A shuttle valve is installed to make it possible to switch between the pods. 
 
4.8 Back-up control systems 
Which type of back-up system to use, will vary depending on the manufacturer of the BOP 
and the rig-type. In this section, various systems presented in Holand (2012) are listed, 
together with a briefly description. 
ROV: Remotely operated vehicle, with intervention capability. The ROV can mechanically 
control the valves through the ROV intervention panel on the BOP. This can typically be to 
activate the BSR, or other rams or disconnect the LMRP connector. 
EDS: Emergency disconnect system. This system activates at least one shear ram to seal the 
well, and disconnect the LMRP connector from the BOP stack.  
AMF: Automatic mode function.  Similar to the Deadman system. 
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EH: Electro hydraulic (back-up). Separate controls activated by electro hydraulic signals 
manually. 
Acoustic back-up controls: Separate control system for selected functions. Activates by 
sending acoustic signals from the rig, or alternatively another vessel. Powered by a dedicated 
accumulator bank. No automatic activation. 
Deadman: Initiates automatically, if the BOP is losing power signals and its hydraulic 
supply. Closes at least one blind shear ram and disconnect the LMRP from the BOP stack. 
Autoshear: Automatic shear if LMRP disconnects spuriously. 
 
 
Figure 21: Basic principles of electro hydraulic/MUX control system (from Padøy, 2011). 
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Chapter 5 
Approaches for the Assessment of Dynamic Barriers 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with approaches for the assessment of dynamic barriers. Different 
approaches are described, and one new approach is proposed and carried out as a case study. 
The method called drillers HAZOP has not been given as much weight as the other methods 
being described.   
 
5.2 Event tree analysis 
Event tree analysis (ETA) is a graphical and probabilistic method for modeling and analysis 
of accident scenarios. This method can be used to analyze all types of technical systems, with 
or without operator.  It is an inductive method which follows a forward logic. The starting 
point of the tree is an identified hazardous event, and the end points are the possible outcomes 
or consequences. Various methods can be used to identify the hazardous event, such as a 
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), and the Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality 
Analysis method. According to Rausand (2011) the occurrences of the hazardous events are 
often modeled by a homogenous Poisson process with frequency  , which is the number of 
occurrences, per time unit. Depending on the objectives and the availability of relevant data, 
the ETA may be qualitative, quantitative, or both.  The possible accident scenarios that may 
follow the hazardous event and the system`s response to these are displayed in a diagram. 
After starting with the hazardous event, the tree splits at certain stages in the structure. The 
splitting takes place when specified pivotal events occur. These events may be function or 
failure of barriers, but may also be certain events or states. The diagram is usually drown from 
left to right, with the pivotal events, formulated as a “negative” statement, and listed as 
headings above the tree diagram. In most cases, the pivotal events has a binary outcome, 
TRUE/FALSE or YES/NO, but multiple outcomes such as YES/PARTLY/NO are also 
possible. In most systems, the possible hazardous events are identified during the design 
process. To stop or mitigate the consequences from the hazardous event, a number of barriers 
have been provided. Typical barriers might be technical equipment, emergency procedures, 
human interventions, or a combination of these.   
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5.2.1 Objectives 
In Rausand (2011) the main objectives of an event tree analysis are: 
1) Identify the accident scenarios that may follow the hazardous event. 
2) Identify the barriers that are (or planned to be) provided to prevent or mitigate the harmful 
effects of the accident scenarios. 
3) Assess the applicability and reliability of these barriers in relevant accident scenarios. 
4) Identify internal and external events that may influence the event sequences of the scenario 
– or its consequences. 
5) Determine the probability of each accident scenario. 
6) Determine and assess the consequences of each accident scenario. 
 
5.2.2 Advantages and Limitations 
The ETA is widely accepted, and simple in use. The structure of the method makes it easy to 
follow the development from the hazardous event, through the various pathways created by 
the barriers in place, to the end event. The pathways give different outcomes, thus giving an 
insight of the need for new or improved barriers. 
  A standard for drawing the tree is non-existent, this may be confusing and allows 
different interpretations. The ETA can only analyze one hazardous event at the time, and 
dependencies, such as common cause failures, are difficult to handle in the qualitative ETA.  
  
5.3 Fault Tree Analysis  
A FT is a top-down logic diagram that displays the interrelationships between a potential 
critical event in a system and the causes of this event (Rausand, 2011).  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is one of the most commonly used methods for risk and 
reliability studies. This method has traditionally been applied to mechanical and 
electromechanical systems, but can also be applied to other types of systems. Depending on 
the scope of the analysis, the FTA may be qualitative, quantitative, or both. 
FTA is a deductive method starting with a specified potential critical event, called the TOP 
event. Deductive means that we reason backwards from the specified event. The causal events 
leading to the TOP event are identified, and connected through logic gates. This process is 
continued until a suitable level of details about the system is reached. At the lowest level we 
find such as component failures, environmental conditions and human errors, these are called 
basic events.  
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 In Appendix E an overview of the most common symbols used in a FT and a 
description of these is presented. 
 No intermediate states are allowed in the FT. All events are assumed to be binary, 
meaning that the events either occur or not occur. For each potential TOP event in the system 
a separate FT must be constructed, this because a FT is single event – oriented. 
 For the TOP event to occur, the basic events or a combination of these must occur. 
The FT will provide information about these possibilities of events and such a combination of 
basic events is called a cut set. In Rausand (2004) a cut set is defined as: “A cut set in a fault 
tree is a set of basic events whose (simultaneous) occurrence ensures that the TOP event 
occurs”. Rausand (2004) defines a minimal cut set as:”A cut set is said to be minimal if the 
set cannot be reduced without losing its status as a cut set”. The minimal are the most 
interesting cut sets. 
 
5.3.1 Objectives 
According to Rausand (2011) the main objectives of a FTA are: 
1) To identify all possible combinations of basic events that may result in a critical event 
in the system. 
2) To find the probability that the critical event will occur during a specified time interval 
or at a specified time t, or the frequency of the critical event. 
3) To identify aspects (e.g., components, barriers, structure) of the system that need to be 
improved to reduce the probability of the critical event.   
 
5.3.2 Advantages and Limitations 
The FTA is widely accepted and easy to use, with a logical form of presentation. It is suited 
for failures of both technical and human nature, and capable of handling complex systems. By 
breaking down failures in this manner, potential sources are revealed, and re-thinking of both 
design and how the system is operated can be done. 
  A drawback performing the FTA is the static picture being given between failures and 
the event being looked at. This makes it less suitable for dynamic systems. The method only 
treats anticipated events, and can become time-consuming and complicated when large 
systems are being analyzed. 
 
 
46         Chapter 5. Approaches 
 
5.4 Drillers HAZOP 
A drillers` HAZOP is a method for performing Hazard and Operability studies of drilling 
systems and procedures developed by Comer et al. (1986). This method uses the same basic 
approach as the traditional process HAZOP, but other guidewords are introduced. Novel 
features are introduced for drilling operations which are essentially sequences of mechanical 
and manual handling operations by teams of people. For these operations a Multiple Activity 
Chart (MAC) has been developed. The traditional set of guide words was found to be 
unsuitable for analysis of the MAC, and an alternative set was developed. Traditional 
guidewords are NO, MORE, LESS, REVERSE in combination with the names of the one-
dimensional variables FLOW, PRESSURE and TEMPERATURE. This basic deviation set is 
supplemented if required, by the variables: LEVEL, COMPOSITION, PHASE and the non-
specific guideword CHANGE. One-word descriptions of deviations such as CORROSION 
and MAINTENANCE have also been used as supplement. 
  Since many drilling activities can be related to problems with manual or mechanical 
handling, which the traditional set, has little relevance to, the drillers` HAZOP method has 
developed an alternative set. The basic variable in this is MOVEMENT.  This variable is split 
into three: MOVEMENT UP, MOVEMENT DOWN and MOVEMENT ACROSS. These 
create the basic set of deviation, and are combined with the traditional guide words NO, 
MORE, LESS and REVERSE.  
  The main features of the HAZOP analysis are that it is conducted by a team of people 
working together in so called brainstorming sessions. To support the participants guidewords, 
process parameters, and various checklists are used. The system being considered is divided 
into study nodes. These are examined one by one, and the design intent and the normal state 
are defined for each of them. All possible deviations are examined during the sessions with 
help from the guidewords and the process parameters, in order to identify possible hazardous 
situations. As in the traditional HAZOP, identification and assessment of deviations from the 
desired state is the center of discussion. A set of recommendations and questions is the output 
from the study. 
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5.5 New approach 
This suggested approach is a combination of FTA and ETA. ETA is used to show the 
dynamics of the hazardous event, and the involvement of different barriers and the 
development of different paths towards the end event. The end event will give an insight of 
the success of the barrier involvement, and the need for any necessary changes.   
  FTA is used for breaking down the different elements involved in the barriers, and 
finding out what makes the TOP event of the tree happening. Failure rates and Probability of 
failure on demand (PFD) are calculated for some selected outcomes in the ET using FTA. 
 
5.6 Case study  
In this section, the suggested approach is used for reliability assessment of the barriers during 
drilling. A kick is considered a hazardous event for this case, and it is assumed that the 
primary barrier is lost, which is essential to get this kick. It is further assumed that this is an 
OBD-operation with pipe in the hole, and performed in deep waters with a classical BOP-
stack in place (see Figure 14 in Section 4.4.2). 
In Figure 22, all the barrier elements during drilling are placed in an ET showing 
various outcomes (end events) depending on the functionality of the barriers. The ET shows 
various pathways from a kick to a secure close-in of the kick, or an escalation into a blowout.  
The elements with the ability to identify a possible kick are also been included. It is important 
to be able to recognize the kick signs, how to react and take action upon them if this is 
necessary. All this, and other measures surrounding a kick, together with explanations for the 
kick- and kick identification fault tree are further elaborated in Chapter 6.  
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Figure 22: Event tree of barrier elements involved from a kick to blowout during drilling. 
Chapter 5. Approaches   49 
 
 
KICK
BOP fails to 
seal annulus
Circulate out the 
kick fails
True
False
Kelly valve fails to 
close
Blind shear ram
fails
End event
Hazardous
event
1
2
6
5
4
3
2
5
5
4
3
1
 
Figure 23: Simplified event tree. Drilling 
 
Figure 23 illustrates a simplified ET for the escalation from a kick to a blowout during 
drilling, involving kick circulation. Here it is assumed that the kick is detected, and proper 
actions engaged. The “Transfer in” symbols used in Figure 23, means that this event is further 
developed using a FT later in this section.  
 
Outcomes/ end events for Figure 23: 
1. Full blowout.  
2. Kick killed with HC below the blind shear ram. 
3. Full blowout. 
4. Kick killed with HC below the blind shear ram. 
5. Kick killed with HC in drill-pipe and below the BOP. 
6. Balance in well restored. 
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5.6.1 Failure rates 
Figure 23 is used to calculate the failure rate   for the outcomes 1 and 6. Failure rate is the 
numbers of failures per time unit. Estimating failure rates in this chapter, the unit per day is 
used, meaning per BOP-day (number of days from the BOP was landed on the wellhead the 
first time until it was pulled from the wellhead the last time). 
 
Kick:    
The kick frequency used comes from the study performed by  Holand (2012), and states 5.4 
kicks/1000 BOP-days, which is          per day. 
 
BOP fails to seal annulus:    
    2.49 *   
   per day (calculated in Section 6.6.2). 
 
Circulating out the kick fails:    
For estimating the failure rate for ”Circulating out the kick fails”, data from Holand (2001) is 
used. In this study, 48 kick were reported. For 42 of the kicks, circulation was tried to regain 
control, and of these circulation alone was used in 29 of them. For calculating the failure rate, 
it is argued that the circulation failed in 13 of 42 kicks, because additional measures had to be 
used to regain control. The number of BOP-days is 4009 for this study. 
   = 
  
    
 =          per day 
 
Kelly valve fails to close:    
This failure rate must be based on a comparable component, using a topside valve (Sintef, 
2013). The value only includes the valve itself. 
            
   per day 
 
Blind shear ram fails:      
The calculated failure rate for the ram preventers are being used here, because of lack of 
other, more specific data.    = 1.29 *   
   per day. 
Outcome calculations: 
1:    =            
 =          + 2.49 *       1.29 *      =           per day =          per year, or 
approximately once every 45455 years. 
2:    =               ) 
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3:    =                        
4:    =                            ) 
5:    =                        ) 
6:    =                    ) 
  =          + (1- 2.49 *    ) + (1-         ) = 1.99971 per day =           per year, 
or approximately once every 183 years. 
Remark: Seen in retrospect, perhaps calculating the probability would be a more adequate                         
measure here. 
 
5.6.2 PFD 
PFD is the measure for loss of safety caused by dangerous undetected failures. PFD is the 
average probability of failure on demand over a period of time (Sintef, 2013). 
A rough PFD assessment of “BOP fails to seal annulus” is being made here. It is 
assumed that there are two annular preventers, three ram preventers, and a control system, and 
that these are independent and only these can affect the TOP event. It is further assumed that 
there is no possibility to switch for the control system. 
 
BOP
fails to seal
annulus
Ram
preventer
fails
Annular
preventer
fails
Control
system 
fails
 
Figure 24: FT for BOP fails to seal annulus. 
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To estimate the critical failure rate for these items, information from Holand (2012) has been 
used. According to Holand (2012) the failure rate can be calculated as follows: 
 
  = 
                  
                          
 = X failures per day in service 
 
The number of BOP days multiplied with the number of items is used as the accumulated 
operating time or days in service for the BOP failures. E.g., if the BOP stack has been in 
service for 2000 BOP-days, and there are three rams present, the accumulated operating time 
will be 2000 BOP-days multiplied by three rams, which equals 6000 days in service. 
 
Table 5: Observation of BOP failures (from Holand, 2012). 
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Table 6: Overview of BOP failures (from Holand, 2012). 
 
 
Table 6 takes into account the number of items for each subsystem- component in the stack, 
so the days in service can be read directly from the table. A multiplex electro-hydraulic has 
been chosen as control system. All failures that occur in the BOP after the installation test are 
regarded as safety critical failures, and these are used to calculate the different failure rates. 
This is when the BOP acts as a well barrier. Calculation of the critical failure rates per day for 
the annular preventers, the ram preventers and the control system can be done as follows: 
 
         = 
                       
               
 = 
  
     
 = 4.97 *      per day 
     = 
  
     
 = 1.29 *      per day 
                = 
  
     
 = 1.86 *      per day 
 
   =    +    +    
   =    = 4.97 *   
   +              + 1.86 *      = 2.49 *      per day 
 
When estimating the PFD, the test frequency must be known. NORSOK D-010 (2013) states 
that the annular and the pipe ram shall be function tested weekly. Since we use the control 
system to activate them, the same frequency is used here. Figure 25 shows the type of system 
being considered, and the numbers indicate the k-out -of- n structure (koon). The number of 
components is represented by n. 
 
     = 
        
 
 
 = 
               
 
 = 
         
 
 =           
     = 
        
 
 
 = 
               
 
 = 
          
 
 =            
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     = 
        
 
 = 
              
 
 = 
        
 
 =           
 
P (TOP) = 1- (1-      ) (1-      ) (1-      ) 
P (BOP fails to seal annulus) = 1- (1-           ) (1 -           ) (1 -          )         
    =           = 0.00433 
 
For this PFD calculation only the equipment are being considered, with no influences from 
humans, etc.  
 
 
 
Annular 
preventer
1oo2
Ram 
preventer
1oo3
Control 
system
1oo1
 
Figure 25: Block diagram of “BOP fails to seal annulus”. 
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5.6.3 Fault trees 
The following pages show various fault trees from the “Transfer in” symbols used in Figure 
23, and events related to this. 
 
 
 
2
BOP fails to seal 
annulus
UPR
fails
LAP
fails
UAP
fails
MPR
fails
LPR
fails
6 7 8 9 10
 
 
Figure 26: FT “BOP fails to seal annulus” 
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Figure 27: FT “Kick”. 
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Figure 28: FT “Circulating out the kick fails”. 
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11
 
 
Figure 29: FT “Kelly valve fails”. 
 
5
BSR
fails
Control system 
fails
Failure in 
BSR
11
Fail to close
Leakage in 
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Fail to seal, if 
used to shear
 
Figure 30: FT “Blind shear ram fails”. 
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Figure 31: FT “Upper annular fails”. 
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Control system
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Fail to close
 
Figure 32: FT “Lower annular fails”. 
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Pipe do not fit
 
 
Figure 33: FT “Upper pipe ram fails”. 
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Control system
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Pipe do not fit
 
 
Figure 34: FT “Middle pipe ram fails”. 
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Figure 35: FT “Control system fails”. 
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Figure 36: FT “Fails to activate function”. 
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Figure 37: FT “Lower pipe ram fails”. 
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Chapter 6 
Kicks - categories, Causes, and Handling 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Kick is unwanted influx to the well, and is an important factor when addressing well barriers. 
This chapter deals with the most important issues related to kicks in OBD.  
 The primary barrier in OBD, is as previously mentioned, the mud column. If you lose 
this barrier, a kick may occur. The kick can be controlled or escalate into a blowout. Kicks 
may develop as a result of non-detection, or too late response, and thereby not putting barriers 
into action. Even if the kick is detected, the proper action may not be initiated because of 
improper training or lack of knowledge. Malfunction or lack of control equipment may also 
be reasons for the development of a kick. The potential blowout can be classified as a surface, 
subsurface, or underground blowout. 
 
6.2 Warning signs of kicks 
Warning signs and possible kick indicators may be observed at the surface. It is crucial to 
recognize and interpret these signals, and to take proper actions. Early detection is important 
to be able to reduce the possibility of a blowout. Not all signs positively identify a kick, some 
are warnings of potential kick situations. 
Signs to watch for: 
 Flow rate increase 
 Pit volume increase 
 Flowing well with pumps off 
 Pump pressure decrease and pump stroke increase 
 String weight change 
 Drilling break 
 Cut mud weight 
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6.3 Kick detection  
The human factor in detection is very important in reading instruments and recognizing and 
interpreting kick signals. Time of detection is also an important factor for the outcome of a 
potential kick. If we assume that the time of kick detection will affect the BOP reliability, it is 
important to close with the HC below the BOP, and not after it has entered the riser. 
According to Hauge et al. (2012), the probability of BOP failure is higher with flow up the 
riser. Once again the timing is important. 
 
 
Figure 39: Surface metering of flow out compared to input flow, and of volume  
                              change in the pit (from Skalle, 2011). 
 
 
During the drilling process various parameters are monitored to gain geological information 
and to determine the well integrity. Figure 39 shows two instruments that can detect a 
possible kick, the return flow meter, and the pit level indicator located in the active mud pit. 
These are monitoring the flow rate and the pit volume, which are operational parameters. An 
increase in these two is considered a warning sign. Drilling parameters such as drill-string 
torque and drilling rate of penetration (ROP) are also continuously monitored, together with 
properties of the mud, such as content and temperature. The information about the drilling 
parameters can be gained from several sources. Seismic data, measurement while drilling 
(MWD) and mud logging can be ways of monitoring and record the parameters mentioned. 
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6.4 Factors affecting kick severity 
There are several factors affecting the severity of a kick. The permeability of the 
rock/formation is one factor to consider. By this means the rock`s ability to allow fluid to 
move through it. Another factor is porosity, which measures the amount of space in the rock 
containing fluids. A rock with high permeability and high porosity has greater potential for a 
kick than a rock with low permeability and low porosity. Sandstone is an example of this, 
compared with shale. 
The pressure differential is also a factor affecting kick severity. By this means the 
difference between the Pp and the Ph. If the Pp is much greater than the Ph, there is a negative 
differential pressure, and this combined with high permeability and high porosity, can cause 
the occurrence of a severe kick.  
 
6.5 Categories of kicks 
A kick can be categorized in several ways. Categorizing according to the type of formation 
fluid entering the borehole is one of them. This is done by dividing into liquid or gas entering. 
If a gas enters the borehole, the kick is called a “gas kick”.  
Gas expands when approaching the lower pressure near the surface, a small volume of 
gas at the bottom is potentially dangerous. When the gas expands it will displace a 
corresponding amount of mud from the well, thus reducing the BHP, which in turn allows 
more gas to flow in from the pores. For those who control kicks, the understanding of gas 
behavior under different well conditions is important, and the driller will be dependent upon 
this knowledge. Salt-water and oil are incompressible, and are therefore not as hard to handle 
as gas.  
Another way of categorizing is by identifying the required mud weight increase 
necessary to control the well and kill a potential blowout.  
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6.6 Kick causes 
This section deals with the causes leading to a kick, illustrated in Figure 27 in Chapter 5. The 
causes are for drilling downwards only, and do not take into consideration other types of 
operations.  
 
6.6.1 Unexpected high well pressure 
The main reason for experiencing a kick caused by unexpected high well pressure seems to be 
lack of reservoir knowledge. This can be a result of having wrong Pp prognosis, or poor 
preparations in the well planning phase. According to Holand (1996) this cause for losing the 
primary barrier is reported more frequently for exploration drilling than for development 
drilling. 
 
6.6.2 Too low mud weight 
Holand (2012) explains the occurrence of a kick caused by too low mud weight by the 
relatively small difference between the fracture pressure and the Pp. It is also pointed out that 
the annulus friction during circulation is likely to affect this problem. 
  One of the most obvious ways to “invite” a kick into the wellbore is to use/operate 
with a mud with insufficient density. The drilling mud is mixed continuously using different 
types of additives. The density of the mud is reduced if the amount of solids is less than it 
should be, or planned to be. The wrong density of the mud can be caused by equipment 
failure, such as improper mixing of the mud, causing e.g., Barite to settle at the bottom of the 
mud pit. If this happens, mud with a lower density than calculated will be circulated down the 
hole. Human errors such as miscalculations and too much dilution of the mud may also occur. 
 
6.6.3 Gas cut mud 
Gas cut mud occurs when formation gas mixes with the mud while drilling. This mixture 
reduces the mud density and reduces the Ph. When the Ph reaches a certain level, the 
hydrostatic control of the well will be lost, and a kick may occur.  
 
6.6.4 Lost circulation 
Lost circulation usually occurs because the Ph exceeds the formation fracture gradient. When 
this happens, the mud enters the formation. The amount of mud pumped down the hole does 
not equal the amount being brought to surface again. There can be a partial or total loss of 
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circulation. Usually, all the mud is not lost, the formation partly returns the losses, and this is 
called the ballooning effect. 
The formation can be naturally fractured or having high permeability, or there can be 
equipment failures or human errors causing the formation to fracture and thereby invite mud 
into the formation.  
 
Other significant contributors to the occurrence of the kick are swabbing and improper fill up 
which occur during tripping out of the hole. Disconnecting of the riser is also a complicated 
issue that must be considered. These contributors are outside the scope of this project, and are 
not further elaborated. 
 
6.7 Kick handling  
When a kick has been detected and verified, necessary steps to circulate the kick out of the 
well must be taken. Generally, the well will be shut-in to limit the influx of formation fluids, 
and circulation started. Experience and training together with knowledge are crucial in these 
situations to get it done in a controlled manner. 
 
6.7.1 Shut-in procedures 
There are two main procedures for shutting in a well in drilling operations. The major 
difference between these is whether to close the BOP with the choke open or closed. 
The hard shut-in is where the BOP is closing in the well while the choke is in a closed 
position. A phenomenon called the water-hammer effect is a concern using this method. It can 
be compared with shutting off running water from a tap with a sudden move, which is a 
common, every day thing, which is easy to relate to. By doing so, the water pipes make noise 
due to the sudden pressure pulse sent through the water. An analogy to the tap, is believed to 
sometimes occur in the sudden shutting in a well. The sudden closure of the BOP will cause 
pressure pulses to move down the wellbore, and possibly cause formation damage. This is not 
the case using old taps, as these must be turned downwards, and this can be compared to 
gradually closing the choke.  
A soft shut-in involves closing the BOP with the choke open, and then shutting in the 
well by closing the choke.  
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Formation damage and added influx-time are the main concerns with these methods. The hard 
shut-in is less time consuming, which able the possibility of a quicker stop of influx and 
reduces the risk of human errors controlling the choke.  
 
Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages, so past experience, geologic 
environment and personal preferences must be used for discussion making.  
 
6.7.2 Conventional Kick Circulation 
After one of the two previous shut-in methods, the next step is to safely circulate the kick out 
of the well. The driller`s method and the wait and weight method (W&W) are the 
conventional methods used today. W&W is also referred to as the Engineer`s method. 
According to Skalle (2011), the most commonly used method to restore an overbalanced 
situation after a kick is the driller`s method. 
 
6.7.3 Driller`s Method 
In the driller`s method the pore fluid is displaced before kill mud is injected. In other words, 
the technique uses two circulations to kill the well. First the kick is circulated to the surface 
(out) using the original weight mud (OWM). (By doing this, further influx is prevented, and it 
ensures that the process can start right away.)  Kill weight mud (KWM) is prepared while the 
kick is circulated out, and then the second circulation kills the well. The method induces 
higher pressure in the un-cased annulus, and compared with W&W more time is required for 
the entire operation. 
 
6.7.4 W & W 
Using the W & W method, the mud weight is being increased and pumped into the well 
immediately. The killing is executed in only one circulation. When the kick is detected, 
verified, and shut-in, the KWM is prepared. After the KWM is ready, the kick is circulated 
out by displacing the OWM with KWM. This method is more complex than the driller`s 
method, as circulating out the kick and killing the well is done in one operation. 
The added time using this method might invite further influx, and as a result the pressures 
might increase. 
Which method to use in the killing of the well depends on many factors. Well design, 
type of kick, location, rig and well type are among the things being considered. But most of 
all it comes down to earlier experiences and personal preferences.  
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Bullheading is also a method being used. When applying this method, mud is pumped back 
into the wellbore with the intent of reversing the flow and fracturing the formation, making 
paths the kick can flow into, and thereby prevent the kick from reaching the surface. 
 
Skalle (2011) purposes the use of the W &W method if there is a risk of fracturing the casing 
shoe. The annular pressure becomes higher when applying the driller`s method, and the choke 
nozzles erode quicker. W & W is used in long open hole sections to reduce the pressure in the 
annulus, otherwise the driller`s method is preferred. 
 
If the kick circulation is a success, the balance in the well is restored, as can be seen from 
Figure 23 in Chapter 5. The same figure also shows that other elements/barriers must be 
initiated to avoid a blowout if the circulation fails.  
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Chapter 7 
Summary and Recommendations for Further Work 
 
7.1 Introduction  
This final chapter sums up the content and the result of the master`s project. The results are 
discussed and recommendations for future work are given. 
 
7.2 Summary and conclusions 
The overall objective was to study, evaluate, and discuss possible approaches to the 
assessment of dynamic well barriers. All the sub-objectives stated in Chapter 1 have been 
answered, at least in the way the author has interpreted them.  
 This report is based on books and literature, and the use of various databases. The 
second chapter uses information found mainly in NORSOK D-010 (2013) when identifying 
and describing traditional well barriers. For the survey of requirements, references to 
NORSOK D-010 (2013) and PSA (2010) are made. Two independent barriers are found to be 
required in all types of well operations, and various other requirements exist in standards and 
guidelines. 
The new standard, ISO/TS 16530-2, has also been mentioned, together with a study 
from DNV GL. In this study, the differences in regulations between the NCS and the Gulf of 
Mexico have been mapped, showing several differences between Norway and the US.  
Well barrier diagrams have been used in the oil and gas industry for decades to assess 
well integrity. Chapter 3 presents various approaches to illustrate well barrier diagrams. A 
horizontal diagram from Holand (1996), a version from Duijm and Markert (2009) and a 
method from Corneliussen (2006) are presented. A new suggested version of a vertical 
diagram, from reservoir at the bottom to the surroundings at the top, is also being illustrated. 
In this approach all the primary barriers have been assembled, and all the secondary barriers 
placed together. Arrows are used to point out the various pathways between the barriers, 
different annuli, to the surroundings.  
Dynamic well barriers during drilling are the main topic in Chapter 4. Overbalanced 
drilling, also referred to as conventional drilling, is the drilling type devoted most 
time/attention, but underbalanced drilling and its main barriers are also introduced and 
highlighted. 
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The mud circulation system is important for both overbalanced and underbalanced 
drilling, and a basic system description is given, together with the purpose of the drilling fluid 
and its most common categories. 
 For overbalanced drilling, only one primary barrier is in place, which is the mud 
column. The secondary barriers are identified in this report, and the purposes and descriptions 
for each one are listed in a table. Furthermore, the BOP and its various components are 
described. The main differences between the two types of drilling are highlighted in the 
report. 
 To operate and control the functions of a BOP stack, a control system is needed. Some 
existing control systems are briefly described, and different types of backup control systems 
mentioned. 
As a part of the report, approaches for the assessment of dynamic well barriers are 
suggested in Chapter 5. Four approaches are described, included a new approach. This new 
approach is a combination of event tree- and fault tree analysis. A case study is selected for 
the use of this approach, and this is an overbalanced drilling operation taking place in deep 
waters, after a kick has occurred. Two event trees are used to illustrate the dynamics of the 
hazardous event, the kick, and various fault trees are used for the purpose of illustrating and 
breaking down the barriers involved in the simplified event tree. This event tree (Figure 23) 
has also been the basis for calculation of failure rates, and the probability of failure on 
demand for a selected barrier. Studies by Holand (2012) and Holand (2001) are used to gain 
information for the calculations. Calculations for two of the end events are made. For the end 
event, “full blowout”, the calculation showed a failure rate of          per year, or 
approximately once every 45455 years. “Balance in well restored” showed a failure rate of 
          per year, or approximately once every 183 years. Comparing these results with 
reliability studies, such as Holand (2012), and the use of common sense, these results must be 
assumed to be unrealistically low. A rough PFD assessment of “BOP fails to seal annulus” 
was made, with a result of 0.00433. This is a SIL 3 level, and is higher than the minimum SIL 
2 level, for isolation using the annulus function, set by OLF (2004). Holand (1999) fault tree 
data shows that the probability to seal the annulus, closing in the kick, only with two annular 
preventers available is estimated to be 0.0018.   
The elements in the fault trees illustrating a “kick” and “kick detection fails” are 
further described in Chapter 6. The content of this chapter are included in the report to create 
a better understanding of the issues surrounding a kick. From the research in this chapter it 
becomes clear that the human factor is important when it comes to detect, interpret signs, and 
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take actions when it comes to a kick. The human decisions being taken during the drilling 
process will have affect on the outcome of hazardous events. 
  
7.3 Discussion 
Section 5.5.1 deals with calculation of failure rates. The results from the calculations seem 
high for the outcomes that have been calculated. A reason for this may be common cause 
failures, and the event tree analysis capability of handling these dependencies. Another reason 
for this can be the placement of the various barriers in the event tree, the activation of the 
barriers are conditional, and assume that another/previous event has occurred. A different 
layout for the event tree, would have given a different result. But seen in retrospect, perhaps a 
more appropriate measure would have been calculating the probability instead, as remarked in 
the report. Determining the probability would probably be a more adequate measure. E.g., we 
do not know if the circulation equipment has worked before, or if it will function as intended, 
when it is needed. The failure rates were calculated to illustrate how it could be done, and not 
using a program to calculate.  
The PFD calculation only considers the reliability of the equipment, and the result 
shows a relatively low probability. This may be due to the relatively frequent testing of the 
equipment, and not including the human factor.   
The new suggested approach for the assessment of dynamic barriers must be tested 
more before a conclusion of its ability can be taken. But maybe it’s becoming a little bit too 
static, only using an event tree to show the dynamic of the hazardous event. The approach is 
limited to a certain operation, and has to be more developed to include other types of drilling 
operations.  
 
7.4 Recommendations for further work 
This thesis was carried out within a limited period of time. The new suggested approach can 
be further developed and tested, thus also be used in other operations.  
There are many operations during drilling, and thereby many topics and possible case 
studies to examine. Tripping out of the hole is one of them, and a large contributor to kick 
occurrence. Improper filling of mud, is one of the causes of lost primary barrier in this 
situation. Disconnecting of the riser is another difficult topic, how to maintain the density of 
the mud and thereby provide an overbalance in the well, called drilling with riser margin. 
Issues surrounding cement and the kick cause, too low hydrostatic head, while the cement 
setting, can also be one. These are just some topics to lock into, and each can be further 
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related to various types of drilling, such as overbalanced and underbalanced. Each drilling 
types will have own “problems” in the assessment of their barriers. 
 
The assessment of dynamic barriers has proven not to be a simple task, and further work must 
be done on the subject. Here are some suggestions for further assessment of the barriers: 
 
Simulation 
The use of computer programs to simulate the various conditions in the well, may be helpful 
to better understand, when and how, the different barriers need more attention. Various 
parameters can be changed easily, and worst case scenarios and kick-conditions can be 
provoked. Existing well procedures can be controlled, and their limitations reveled. 
 
Procedure HAZOP 
This approach is used to review procedures or operational sequences, and can also be seen as 
an extension of a job safety analysis (JSA). The JSA-analysis can be used because the drilling 
process is a nonroutine job with high risk involved, and has lead to several incidents or 
accidents. A further development of the drillers HAZOP may also be possible. 
 
Quantitative requirements 
Only some of the barriers have been awarded SIL requirements in OLF (2004), for various 
reasons. Events such as kick detection and mud circulation have been recommended not to be 
set with a minimum SIL requirement. The reasoning may be questionable, and maybe this can 
be developed/challenged for the next version. Perhaps only parts of the barrier system can be 
given quantitative requirements. It would be easier to look for deviations with something to 
compare with.  
 
The human factor 
What if we could eliminate the human factor in the decision-making-process? Let the 
computer take crucial decisions, such as take proper action surrounding a kick, or to push the 
button to initiate the BSR and close down the well. The computer could be given parameters 
to operate between, and further make a move, when the deviation from the settings is getting 
to large. Would this make things better? A human makes mistakes, but have often the 
capability to understand that, and try to correct it. Risk will always be a part of the petroleum 
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industry as long as there are so many risk influencing factors present at all times in various 
operations.  
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Appendix A 
Acronyms 
AMF  Automatic mode function 
API  American Petroleum Institute 
BHP  Bottom hole pressure  
BOP  Blowout preventer 
BSR  Blind shear ram 
CCU  Central control unit 
CIV  Chemical injection valve 
DHSV  Downhole safety valve 
DNV  Det Norske Veritas   
DNV GL Det Norske Veritas, Germanischer Lloyd 
EDS  Emergency disconnect system 
EH  Electro hydraulic 
ET  Event tree 
ETA  Event tree analysis  
FIT  Formation integrity test 
FT  Fault tree 
FTA  Fault tree analysis 
HAZOP Hazard and operability study  
HC  Hydrocarbons 
HPU  Hydraulic power unit 
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HSE  Health, safety and environment 
ISO  International Organization of Standardization 
JSA  Job safety analysis 
KWM  Kill weight mud 
LAP  Lower annular preventer 
LOT  Leak off test 
LMRP Lower marine riser package 
LPR  Lower pipe ram 
MAC  Multiple Activity Chart 
MUX  Multiplexing control system 
MPR  Middle pipe ram 
MWD  Measurement while drilling 
NCS  Norwegian Continental Shelf 
OBD   Overbalanced drilling 
OLF Oljearbeidernes Fellessammenslutning (The Norwegian Oil Industry 
Association) 
OWM  Original weight mud 
PFD  Probability of failure on demand  
Ph  Hydrostatic pressure 
Pp  Pore pressure 
PSA  Petroleum Safety Authority 
ROP  Rate of penetration 
ROV  Remotely operated vehicle 
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SEM  Subsea electronic module 
SIL  Safety Integrity Level 
SCSSV Surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
TS  Technical specification 
TVD  True vertical depth 
UAP  Upper annular preventer 
UBD  Underbalanced drilling 
UPR  Upper pipe ram 
W & W Wait and weight 
WBE  Well barrier element 
WBS  Well barrier schematic 
WR-SCSSV Wireline Retrievable Surface controlled subsurface safety valve 
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Appendix B 
 Primary well barrier elements during production 
Well barrier element Description Function/Purpose 
In-situ formation 
 
Primary: cap rock 
 
Secondary: 13 3/8 shoe 
 
 
The formation that has been 
drilled through and is located 
beside the casing annulus 
isolation material or plugs set 
in the wellbore. 
 
To provide a permanent and 
impermeable hydraulic seal 
preventing flow from the 
wellbore to surface/seabed or 
other formation zones. 
Casing cement 
 
Primary: (9 5/8”)  
 
Secondary: (13 3/8”) 
Consists of cement in solid 
state located in the annulus 
between concentric casing 
strings, or the casing/liner 
and the formation. 
 
To provide a continuous, 
permanent and impermeable 
hydraulic seal along hole in 
the casing annulus or 
between casing strings, to 
prevent flow of formation 
fluids, resist pressures from 
above or below, and support 
casing or liner strings 
structurally. 
Casing 
 
Primary: (9 5/8”) 
 
Secondary: (13 3/8”) 
Consists of casing/liner 
and/or tubing in case tubing 
is used for through tubing 
drilling and completion 
operations. 
The purpose of casing/liner is 
to provide an isolation that 
stops uncontrolled flow of 
formation fluid or injected 
fluid between the casing bore 
and the casing annulus. 
Production packer Consists of a body with an 
anchoring mechanism to the 
casing/liner, and an annular 
sealing element which is 
activated during installation. 
1. Provide a seal between the 
completion string and the 
casing/liner, to prevent 
communication from the 
formation into the A-annulus 
above the production packer. 
2. Prevent flow from the 
inside of the body element 
located above the packer 
element into the A-annulus 
as part of the completion 
string. 
 
Completion string Consists of tubular pipe One purpose is to provide a 
conduit for formation fluid 
from the reservoir to surface, 
or vice versa. Another 
purpose is to prevent 
communication between the 
completion string bore, and 
the A-annulus. 
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Completion string 
component 
(Chemical injection valve), 
CIV 
Consist of a housing with a 
bore. The completion string 
component is designed to 
prevent undesired 
communication between the 
completion string bore and 
the A-annulus. 
Its purpose may be to 
provide support to the 
functionality of the 
completion, e.g. gas-lift or 
side pocket mandrels with 
valves or dummies, nipple 
profiles, gauge carriers, 
control line with 
seals/connections, etc. 
Downhole safety valve 
(incl. control line) 
Consists of a tubular body 
with a close/open mechanism 
that seals off the tubing bore. 
Its purpose is to prevent flow 
of hydrocarbons or fluid up 
the tubing. 
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Appendix C 
Secondary well barrier elements during production 
Well barrier element Description Function/Purpose 
Wellhead 
(Casing hanger with seal 
assembly) 
Consists of the wellhead 
body with annulus access 
ports and valves, seals and 
casing hangers with seal 
assemblies. 
To provide mechanical 
support for the suspending 
casing and tubing strings and 
for hook-up of risers or BOP 
or tree and to prevent flow 
from the bore and annuli to 
formation or the 
environment. 
Wellhead / annulus access 
valves 
Consists of an annulus 
isolation valve(s) and valve 
housing(s) connected to the 
wellhead. 
To provide ability to monitor 
pressure and flow to/from the 
annuli. 
Tubing hanger 
(body seals and neck seal) 
Consists of a body, seals, 
feed throughs, and bore(s) 
which may have a tubing 
hanger plug profile. 
1. Support the weight of the 
tubing; 
2. Prevent flow from the bore 
and to the annulus; 
3. Provide a hydraulic seal 
between the tubing, wellhead 
and tree; 
4. Provide a stab-in 
connection point for bore 
communication with the tree. 
5.  Provide a profile to 
receive a BPV or plug to be 
used for nippling down the 
BOP and nippling up the 
tree. 
Wellhead 
(WH / XT Connector) 
Consists of the wellhead 
body with annulus access 
ports and valves, 
seals and casing hangers with 
seal assemblies. 
To provide mechanical 
support for the suspending 
casing and tubing 
strings and for hook-up of 
risers or BOP or tree and to 
prevent flow from the bore 
and annuli to formation or 
the environment. 
Surface tree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consists of a housing with 
bores that are fitted with 
swab-, master valves, 
kill/service valves and flow 
valves. 
1. provide a flow conduit for 
hydrocarbons from the 
tubing into the surface lines 
with the ability to stop the 
flow by closing the flow 
valve and/or the master 
valve; 
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Surface tree (continues..) 2. provide vertical tool 
access through the swab 
valve; and 
3. provide an access point 
where kill fluid can be 
pumped into the 
tubing. 
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Appendix D 
Example of possible well leak paths 
 
 
Figure: Well diagram showing some typical modes of well failure 
                                  (from ISO/TS 16530-2, 2014
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Appendix E 
Fault tree symbols  
(from Rausand, 2004) 
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